By Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Philip Lorenz, Paul W. Chambers (auth.)
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Extra resources for Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia
They explain the emergence or failure of civilian control as the outcome of strategic interactions between civilian and military actors (Hunter, 1997; Geddes, 1999). Theories belonging to the ﬁrst category are confronted with the problem that environmental variables doubtlessly have an inﬂuence on the outcome of civil–military relations, but they cannot bring it about themselves. Rather, they only become relevant through the concrete actions of civilian political actors and military leaders. At the same time, ‘agency’ does not happen in a vacuum but is inﬂuenced at least to some degree by ‘structure’.
Such an understanding, however, poses several problems (see also Feaver, 1996, 2003; Fitch, 1998; Desch, 1999). Conceptually, military coups are only the tip of the iceberg. The coup/no-coup dichotomy, however, raises this most extreme form of military intervention in politics to the position of being the only point of reference against which all other states of civil–military relations are compared (Luckham, 1971). This not only implies that there are no threats to civilian control other than coups, and that other instances of the military asserting its power are acceptable; it also masks the fact that the absence of coups might actually be an indicator of the political strength of the military.
Civilian control is low if the military dominates decision making or implementation in that area. 1 summarizes the operationalization of the ﬁve decision-making areas. 1 Elite recruitment The area of elite recruitment deﬁnes the rules, criteria, and processes for the recruitment, selection, and legitimation of the holders of political ofﬁce. The actor who controls this area has the power to deﬁne ‘who rules and who decides who rules’ (Taylor, 2003: 7). Following Robert Dahl (1971: 4–6), these rules and procedures can be analytically disaggregated into two theoretical dimensions: (1) the rules of competition, that is, the degree of openness of the political processes, and (2) participation, that is, the inclusiveness of the political competition.
Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia by Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Philip Lorenz, Paul W. Chambers (auth.)