By Phil Dowe, Paul Noordhof
Reason and likelihood is a set of particularly written papers by way of world-class metaphysicians. Its concentration is the issues dealing with the "reductionist" method of causation: the try and conceal all kinds of causation, deterministic and indeterministic, with one easy idea.
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Extra info for Cause and Chance
The former could be defeated by pointing out that he loves getting soaked by rain; the latter could be defeated by pointing out that she knew very well that Mike was in America. So we have: 1 H. Because E. And (probably) ¬H⇒¬E. Defeated if (probably) H⇒¬E. Undefeated if (probably) H⇒E. 2 H. Because E. And (probably) H⇒E. Defeated if (probably) ¬H⇒E. Undefeated if (probably) ¬H⇒¬E. That is, for a good argument from E to H, we want it to be probable that if H had not been the case, E would not have been the case; and we want it to be probable that if H had been the case, E would have been the case.
Menzies 1999: 314) Elsewhere Menzies takes intrinsicality to be a fundamental platitude in the folk concept of causation (Menzies 1996). And David Armstrong writes: ‘The causal structure of a process is determined solely by the intrinsic character of that process’ (Armstrong 1999: 184). The spatiotemporal relations between the two paths are contingent. In Counterexample #1 the two paths coincide substantially. But they need not. Suppose I push my friend out of the way of a bus, on to the footpath, but unfortunately she is hit by a falling stone and dies.
I shrug this off as irrational advice, which it is. I miss the plane. It crashes. ’, I say, on hearing the news. ’ Similarly, if someone tells me that if I choose ticket number 65 87 92 … I will win, or that if I bet on heads, I will win, or that if I buy these shares, I will become rich, and so on. Even if not rationally grounded, these unfulfilled conditionals are vindicated. The case for the temporal relation between ‘wills’ and ‘woulds’ remains: one is right iff the other is. The hindsightful counterfactual vindicates the earlier ‘will’, even if the ‘will’ was not justified at the time.
Cause and Chance by Phil Dowe, Paul Noordhof