By John Tirman, James G. Blight, Janet M. Lang, Hussein Banai, Malcolm Byrne
Turning into Enemies brings the original tools of severe oral background, built to review flashpoints from the chilly warfare corresponding to the Cuban Missile hindrance, to appreciate U.S. and Iranian family members from the autumn of the Shah in 1978 during the Iranian hostage drawback and the Iran-Iraq struggle. students and previous officers concerned with U.S. and UN coverage take a clean examine U.S and Iranian family members in this time, with particular emphasis at the U.S. position within the Iran-Iraq conflict. With its awesome declassified documentation and oral testimony that undergo without delay on questions of U.S. policymaking with reference to the Iran-Iraq battle, changing into Enemies unearths a lot that used to be formerly unknown approximately U.S. coverage earlier than, in the course of, and after the struggle. They transcend mere reportage to provide classes concerning primary international coverage demanding situations to the U.S. that go beyond time and position.
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Extra info for Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988
He who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate h is whereabouts. ”] Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. ] O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! ] and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
So he left the capital with his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 li when he stopped and began throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch`in general was overjoyed, and attributed his adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position on the “North hill” before the enemy had got wind of his movements.
D) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. e) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. ” It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue interference wit h operations in the field on the part of the home government. ] Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988 by John Tirman, James G. Blight, Janet M. Lang, Hussein Banai, Malcolm Byrne